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Abstract 
This benchmarking study compares how railway investments are procured in five European countries: Sweden, Norway, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. In total, 19 procurement managers and project managers were interviewed. This 
study compares the national rail clients’ procurement strategies regarding: delivery system, reward system, contractor 
selection, and collaboration model. Historically, these clients have used in-house production. The first step towards a 
gradually increased usage of the market was to outsource the construction activities while keeping the design and 
development competence in-house. All five countries have mainly used Design-Bid-Build contracts in their initial 
outsourcing. However, the last few years there is a discernible trend in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK 
towards allocating more design and development responsibilities to contractors (i.e. Design-Build contracts) and 
increasing the strategic focus on cooperation. The UK and the Netherlands are forerunners in this trend that can be 
viewed as a third step in the transition towards a market oriented railway sector. Norway and Sweden is in the middle of 
this transition, whereas Germany has not initiated this change. The transition towards a gradually increased usage of the 
market has two main dimensions; degree of cooperation and degree of contractor freedom, which differs among the 
countries. The UK and Sweden focus on increasing both these dimensions, while The Netherlands and Norway mostly 
focus on increasing the degree of contractor freedom. Germany still limits both dimensions by performing design and 
development in-house and letting contractors compete for construction work in Design-Bid-Build contracts. Due to 
historical and cultural reasons, Deutsche Bahn in Germany is very hesitant to engage in collaboration with external 
suppliers; focusing on competition is considered more appropriate and less controversial. 
Keywords: Competition; Cooperation; Infrastructure Projects; Railway Investments; Public Procurement. 
 
1. Introduction 
The European railway systems are critical for both long-distance and commuter traffic, as well as freight 
transportation [1]. Until the early 1990s, most European railway systems were organized in the form of state-owned 
and vertically integrated monopolies [2]. The EU directives from 1991 (Dir.91/440/EEG) stipulates the separation of 
the national railways into different organizations for owning and developing the infrastructure and for operation and 
transport activities. Following this trend, all or parts of the design, construction and maintenance of railway 
infrastructure have been deregulated and opened for competition in many countries.  
In deregulated railway sectors, clients’ procurement strategies heavily influence both efficiency and innovation in 
construction projects [3]. Despite this, innovation needs and opportunities are seldom considered when choosing 
procurement strategy [4]. Instead it is often more short-term efficiency related objectives, such as cost, time and 
quality, which are considered [5]. This focus on short-term efficiency may hinder innovation and thereby sustainable 
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development. In fact, an investigation shows that high-speed rail projects in Europe generally result in cost overruns, 
which can be reduced by better appraisals [6]. The challenge for public clients in the infrastructure sector, such as rail 
administrations in the European countries, is thereby to develop and implement procurement strategies that provide 
suppliers with possibilities and incentives to enhance long term socioeconomic efficiency, i.e. take on a life cycle cost 
(LCC) perspective.  
Although procurement strategies are a widely studied topic in the construction and engineering industry, specific 
research on railway procurement is scarcer. This is not surprising since it is a relatively new phenomenon, as 
deregulations of the European railway sectors have been implemented gradually and to various degrees in different 
countries the last two decades. As different countries have undertaken deregulations in different ways it gives an 
opportunity to compare and benchmark procurement strategies in different countries. Accordingly, the purpose of this 
study is to compare how railway investments are procured in five European countries: Sweden, Norway, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK. The transport authorities in these countries face challenges related to increased infrastructure 
investments and pressure to improve value for money to tax payers. Procurement strategies are therefore central for 
achieving efficiency and innovation in railway projects. The empirical findings may then serve as a basis for 
knowledge sharing and organizational learning within and across the public client organizations. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Competition, Coopetition and Cooperation 
In any buyer-supplier relationship it is vital to obtain suitable levels of competition and cooperation. Broadly 
speaking, cooperation is the performance of an activity in a way that the actions undertaken by one actor facilitate the 
actions undertaken by the other, whereas competition emerges when the actions undertaken by one actor hinder the 
actions by the other [7]. Competition and cooperation thereby emerge in vertical buyer-supplier relationships where the 
two modes counteract each other [8]. Competition, which is based on the idea that each actor tries to maximize their 
own benefits, is related to individualism and self-centeredness, resulting in conflicts when actors have opposing 
interests [9, 10]. However, competition also provides individual suppliers with incentives to innovate and improve 
efficiency to become more productive. Cooperation, which is based on trust and reciprocity, is in contrast related to 
collectivism and concern for the needs of others. Cooperation can thus be defined as collective work to achieve mutual 
goals [9]. When different actors have mutual goals a win-win situation arises, where actors are interdependent and 
benefit from cooperation, which promotes coordination, adaptation and knowledge sharing [11]. 
Since both competition and cooperation are central for facilitating efficiency and innovation, it is critical to achieve 
a balance between them, that is, coopetition [10]. When deciding how to balance cooperation and competition the 
characteristics and circumstances of the particular project are important to consider. Cooperation is especially relevant 
in projects that are characterized by complexity, customization, uncertainty, long duration, and time pressure. Such 
projects often require coordination of actors and their activities, flexibility and adaptation of activities and their 
contents, as well as knowledge sharing and joint problem solving [8, 12 and 13]. In contrast, simple and standardized 
projects with low uncertainty and little time pressure can be procured with a focus on competition. However, since 
most projects have neither very high nor very low values of these variables, some kind of coopetition is often suitable, 












Figure 1. Coopetition continuum –balancing competition and cooperation [10] 
The balance between cooperation and competition is highly influenced by the client's procurement strategies. Prior 
research on procurement in the construction industry has distinguished how four different procurement strategy 
components affect competition and cooperation in buyer-supplier relationships [8]. The four components are: the 
delivery system and the nature (e.g., timing) of the contractor involvement, the reward system, the contractor selection 
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Table 1. Procurement strategies and their effects on competition and cooperation 
 
Competition Coopetition Cooperation 
Delivery system 
Design by contractor (DB) 
Early involvement in joint design, 
contractor responsible (DB) Joint design with shared 
responsibilities. ECI based on 
consultant contract Design by client (DBB) 
Early involvement in joint design, 
client responsible (DBB) 
Reward system 
Fixed price (lump sum) 
Cost reimbursement with incentives 
and target cost 
Cost reimbursement with 
bonuses 
Fixed unit price 
Contractor selection 
(invitation + evaluation) 
Open invitation Pre-qualification Direct negotiation 
High focus on lowest price Lowest price and soft criteria High focus on soft criteria 
Collaborative tools and 
activities 
No collaborative tools/activities A few collaborative tools/activities 
Many collaborative 
tools/activities 
2.2. Procurement Strategies and Their Components 
2.2.1. Delivery System, Type of Contract and Nature of Contractor Involvement 
There are two main delivery systems; Design-bid-build (DBB) and Design-Build (DB). In DBB contracts a client is 
responsible for design and the contractor for the construction, entailing a detailed description of what work is to be 
undertaken [14]. DBB contracts may be preferable if the client has sufficient expertise and experience to specify how 
to achieve this. A disadvantage is that the absence of contractors' production knowledge during the design may impair 
innovation and efficiency during the production stage, especially in more complex projects.  
In a DB contract, contractors are involved early and responsible for detailed design work [15]. This can promote 
greater exchange of production knowledge between consultants and contractors, which can lead to product design with 
improved constructability. DB contracts also improve the contractor’s opportunities for innovation. A potential 
problem regarding innovation is however rebranding of DBB contracts into DB [16]. DB contracts without degrees of 
freedom for the contractors are not to be expected to deliver innovation.  
Both DB and DBB contracts promote a focus on competition as they separate, allocate, and clarify the actors' 
different responsibilities, which make the contracts more transparent [10]. However, if DBB contracts are procured 
early or if the client is involved in the design stage of a DB contract, both types of contracts can involve some degree 
of joint specification. Then the clients, consultants and contractors work together to promote a synchronized focus on 
innovation and efficient production. In such cases, when the contractor is procured early and the actors engage in joint 
planning and design based on either DB or DBB contracts, where one party has the main responsibility and the other is 
more consultative, coopetition is promoted [17].  
A more collaborative strategy is to fully embrace early contractor involvement (ECI) by adopting a two-stage 
approach, in which partners first carry out joint planning and design based on consultant contracts before going into 
detailed design and production based on DB or DBB contract. Such an ECI approach where buyer and supplier share 
the design work and responsibilities gives a high focus on cooperation [17]. This is suitable when the uncertainty is 
very high and the client requires contractor involvement in very early design stages to integrate design and production 
knowledge. ECI has different meanings in different parts of the world, but a common denominator is that it involves a 
two stage process. First the contractors and other partners are procured to jointly design and define the project, then it 
is possible to set a target cost and sign contracts for the production stage. 
2.2.2. Reward System 
In construction projects, the two main reward systems are fixed price (or lump sum) and cost reimbursement (or 
cost-plus). There are also intermediate alternatives, based on cost reimbursement coupled with incentives, fixed 
contractor fee, and/or bonuses. By procuring a contractor through competitive tendering based on a fixed price the 
client wants to facilitate competition and receive the market's lowest price [10]. This assumes that the tender 
specifications are flawless and exhaustive, which in practice is very difficult and costly to achieve, especially when the 
conditions are not fully understood due to high complexity and uncertainty. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) therefore claim 
that fixed price is appropriate in simple projects with low uncertainty where the product is easy and inexpensive to 
describe and design. This type of payment scheme does not involve any economic incentives for joint problem solving 
and collaborative development, as the contractor will take all profits from cost efficient solutions [18]. Another 
disadvantage is that the contractor has no incentive to deliver added value in the form of higher quality than promised 
[19].  
Fixed unit prices connected to a bill of quantities are common in the infrastructure sector. This reward system 
enhances competition even when there are uncertainties about the scope of the work in terms of quantities of different 
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types of work. It also provides flexibility compared to a pure fixed price since it is easy to make changes in the 
quantities; the contractor gets paid for the actual quantities of work, not the planned or forecasted amount of work. A 
drawback is that the contractor might not have any motivation to innovate or increase the efficiency to lower the 
amount of work, since that will lead to reduced payment.  
Pure cost reimbursement means that the contractor receives payment for all costs incurred, which decrease the risk 
for the contractor [18, 20]. The contractor then has no obvious reason to make more effort than necessary to carry out 
the work, which is negative for cost efficiency. Nor is there any incentive for cost-saving innovation as it may only 
lead to reduced compensation. Quality-enhancing innovations may be somewhat more interesting for the contractor but 
they cannot lead to higher profits, only cost recovery. Due to these drawbacks, this reward system is often coupled 
with economic incentives connected to a target cost, where the actors share gains and pains when the real costs differ 
from the target cost. When incentive-based payment is based on a 50/50 gain/pain share this reward system can be 
regarded as a mix of fixed price and cost-reimbursement, facilitating coopetition. Incentive-based payment is 
particularly suitable for early procurement of contractors and joint specification as it provides collaborative project 
stakeholders a common fate reward for gains due to innovative technologies and efficient improvements. A 
disadvantage of incentive-based payment is that rules on adjusting the target cost tends to be rather complex 
contractual terms that often give rise to discussions or even disputes [21-23].  
To diminish these disruptive disputes of target cost changes, many clients instead use a reward system that includes 
a fixed contractor fee, covering profit, risk and central administration. When using a fixed fee, the contractor will get 
cost reimbursement for the direct operating costs, but the absolute value of the profit is fixed from the outset. For the 
contractor, the fixed fee provides incentives for cost-saving efficiency and innovation as reduced costs will lead to a 
greater relative gain, in terms of a larger profit margin. Another, even more collaborative, alternative is to link bonuses 
to non-economic aspects, such as quality, timeliness, work environment, and environmental impact [5, 24]. The 
contractor can then receive monetary bonuses if certain levels of different functional requirements are exceeded. 
2.2.3. Contractor Selection and Bid Evaluation 
In construction projects, selecting capable contractors is a critical task for clients [25, 26]. Partner selection is 
carried out through bid invitations of potential bidders and bid evaluations that can be focused on lowest price or 
multiple criteria. Sometimes, the bid evaluation may be preceded by a pre-qualification stage where suitable 
contractors are pre-qualified and invited to submit tenders. Whereas an open tender procedure enhances competition, 
pre-qualification and invitation of fewer bidders facilitate more cooperation [17].  
In bid evaluation, a focus on lowest price enhances competition and it is often the most important evaluation 
criterion, especially among public clients that fear appeals from losing bidders [10, 27]. A focus on lowest price 
generates an emphasis on short-term benefits by encouraging reduction of investment costs rather than focus on long-
term life cycle costs and innovation. Due to the drawbacks of lowest price selections, there has been growing interest 
in a shift to multi-criteria selections, also considering soft criteria [25, 28] since it enhances cooperation [8]. It is 
especially vital that tender evaluation focuses on soft criteria in complex projects or when the contractor is expected to 
contribute to innovation in the design stage [29]. Prior construction management research suggests that multiple 
criteria that consider appropriate competences, experiences and attitudes can improve many different performance 
aspects, such as reducing cost and time overruns [30, 31], and improving quality [32], and innovation [26, 29]. 
2.2.4. Collaboration Model and Partnering Arrangements 
In the construction industry, there are many different labels describing collaborative relationships (e.g., alliance and 
integrated project delivery), but the most commonly used term is partnering [33]. Although partnering arrangements 
are based on collaborative procurement strategies affecting all four strategy components, the collaboration model is 
often considered as the core component. Because project actors often interact to co-develop the product, extensive use 
of collaborative activities and tools may be suitable to strengthen cooperation in the partnering team [34, 35].  
Prior research suggests that some examples of vital activities and tools for strengthening cooperation are: 
formulation and follow-up of joint objectives, joint IT-systems, and a joint project office [10, 34]. These collaborative 
activities and tools cost both time and money to implement, but especially in large and complex projects they may 
have positive effects on many performance aspects, making these investments worthwhile [36]. Joint IT-systems 
facilitate integration and communication among project actors and can thus improve time, cost, and quality 
performance [37]. Joint objectives enhance the development of a win–win situation in which all project participants 
together strive to improve project performance as formulated in objectives [36]. Co-location in a joint project office on 
site enhances face-to-face communication and interaction, which is important for innovation [35]. 




3.1. Selection of Countries 
Five European countries that have national transport authorities that procure infrastructure projects were selected 
and accepted to participate in the study. The five countries and their transport authorities are in a period of large 
infrastructure investments that require significant increase in resources and competences. Most of these client 
organizations have therefore decided to handle these challenges by introducing structural changes in the procurement 
and management of projects. The clients also face other challenges such as low competition for tenders, need of 
efficiency improvements and new ways for involving contractors in the process. The following countries are included 
in the study: Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. Because only European countries were 
selected, the clients adhere to the same public procurement act, which enhance comparison and benchmarking among 
them. 
3.2. Data Collection 
In each country interviews were held with procurement managers, project managers and/or project department 
executives, resulting in 2-5 interviews per country. This was important in order to capture both a procurement 
perspective and a project management perspective on how procurement strategies work in practice in railway projects. 
In total, 19 people were interviewed, each interview lasting 20-120 minutes, with an average of 90 minutes. See Table 
2. for more information regarding respondents in each country.  
Table 2. Interviews in five European countries 
Country and organization 







Sweden Trafikverket 2 3 5 
Norway Jernbaneverket 1 1 2 
Germany Deutsche Bahn 1 3 4 












10 9 19 
The interviews were semi-structured and the questions were open-ended and informed by a literature review of 
prior procurement related research within the construction industry. The theoretical framework (see Section 2) served 
as a basis for the collection of the empirical data. To improve validity through triangulation a variety of data collection 
methods and information sources were utilized [38]. In addition to the interviews, approximately 50 hours of document 
studies were performed. The document studies focused on domestic articles and reports that could shed further light on 
the procurement strategies and the railway sector of each country. 
3.3. Data Analysis 
The literature review and the theoretical framework informed the analysis of the empirical material. The transcribed 
interviews where first analyzed for each country. When the empirical data from the interviews had been analyzed and 
summarized into a written within-case story for each country, the texts containing the empirical description of each 
country was sent to one or two of the respondents in the particular country. Each respondent then had the opportunity 
to read the text to verify the content and in some occasions, they added and clarified the text to give a more accurate 
description of their procurement strategies. This approach was conducted to improve the reliability and validity of the 
findings. However, it is important to note that a weakness of this study, as with most other qualitative studies based on 
nonprobability sampling, is that the results are heavily dependent on the selection of respondents. Hence, a different set 
of respondents may have produced somewhat different findings. In order to reduce this risk, several respondents in 
each country have been interviewed and any inconsistencies have been discussed with the respondents. In a second 
step, a cross case analysis where executed during which the findings from each country where compared to identify 
similarities and differences among countries. The structure of empirical findings as well as the analysis is based on the 
theoretical framework including delivery system, reward system, contractor selection and collaboration model. 
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4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Introduction to the investigated countries 
4.1.1. Sweden 
In 1988 it was politically decided that the Swedish state railway should separate railway infrastructure and the train 
operations in two governmental units. In another step 1998, the supply part of the rail administration was separated 
from the client organization and formed its own unit called Rail Production. But it was not until 2001-2002 that the 
market was deregulated and Rail Production was exposed to competition (i.e., privatization). Since 2010 the Swedish 
Transport Administration (TRV) is the client organization responsible for both rail and road infrastructure in Sweden.  
In 2011, TRV initiated a change process towards a more professional client that leaves more freedom and 
responsibilities to suppliers in designing and executing projects through the use of DB contracts. The change process 
aims to develop the supplier market towards improved innovation and productivity [39], which becomes necessary due 
to increased infrastructure investments. TRV has also encouraged larger international companies to enter the Swedish 
market. The changes have, however, been implemented to a larger degree in road production than in railway, mostly 
due to formal responsibilities and regulations related to safety making it more challenging to implement change. DB-
contracts may become less constrained in the future, which is considered critical to enhance creativity and innovation 
from the contractors. 
4.1.2. Germany 
In 1994, Deutsche Bahn AG was founded as a public company during a big railway reform. The aim of this reform 
was to liberalize the railway sector, induce competition, increase railway traffic and relieve the federal government’s 
budget [40, 41]. When it comes to infrastructure procurement the system is vertically integrated, which means that the 
infrastructure and operation/traffic are separate entities under the holding of Deutsche Bahn, although the units are not 
separate companies [40]. Procurement of infrastructure is conducted by a central procurement department at Deutsche 
Bahn AG. The client organization holds a lot of resources in several departments and is performing much design and 
development work in-house, only outsourcing the construction work to the supply market. One reason is the 
difficulties in obtaining the planning and building permissions and Deutsche Bahn does not want to transfer that risk to 
the contractor. A structural change in the coming years is not likely since changes means alterations in regulations and 
rules and consequently a large lobbying process. 
New infrastructure, which means new lines and stations, is funded by the federal government, i.e., the ministry of 
infrastructure. There are some new lines in the pipeline, e.g., a high speed link between Munich and Berlin and from 
Stuttgart to Wendlingen/Ulm. However, most of the projects are smaller in terms of closing gaps in the already 
existing network. 
4.1.3. Norway 
Since 1996 the National Rail Administration, Jernbaneverket (JBV), is responsible for developing new parts and 
maintaining existing parts of the railway system. Investments in new railway infrastructure are considered critical and 
at the core of the reform of the railway sector. Hence, JVB will increase the investment level for railways with more 
than 50 % per year compared to the 2013 budget. This also includes a 100 % increase of investment in large projects 
[42, 43].  
Although JBV is significantly enlarging their project portfolio, they will not enlarge their client organization 
accordingly. Hence, they must allocate more work to contractors. New procurement strategies for infrastructure 
projects have therefore been adopted to provide more efficient implementation. The aim is that projects will be 
completed faster, have lower development costs and attract contractors to invest in long-term productivity 
improvements and organizational development [42]. The overall aim of the procurement strategy is to reduce the total 
costs while at the same time include precision, flexibility and speed (JBV, 2015). To achieve this, JBV has initiated a 
change process, going from primarily using DBB contracts to an approach where more responsibilities are given to the 
contractors using DB contracts. In addition, JBV strives to attract international competition on the Norwegian rail 
market. This is done by increasing the contract sizes and avoiding allocating too much risk to the contractors. The 
ongoing Follo line megaproject is the main vehicle for driving this change process. 
4.1.4. The Netherlands 
ProRail is a public company and has the responsibility for railway infrastructure, including construction, 
management and maintenance, in the Netherlands. Since 1995, ProRail has changed from being a large organization 
with engineers and contractors employed in-house to a smaller organization that today outsource 80-90 % of the yearly 
turnover. Initially, the focus was to start the change from traditional DBB contracting to DB contracting in civil 
engineering work, but during the last 5-6 years the same strategy has been applied to other disciplines, such as railway 
controlling systems, etc. The aim was to provide an increased quality incentive to the contractor by changing the 
reward structure. Instead of being paid per hour, a lump sum payment is used to improve efficiency. 
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Almost every project is procured in an early stage and based on early involvement of the contractor. The change 
also led to a transfer in the responsibility of the design phase and project risk, from client responsibility to contractor 
responsibility. However, in turn the contractor has been given the possibility to influence the development and design 
of projects and their systems to a larger extent than before. It has also resulted in an increased responsibility of the total 
performance, i.e., money and time. 
4.1.5. The UK 
The railway sector in the UK started its journey to privatization in 1994. In 2002, Network Rail (NR) took over as 
owner and operator of Britain’s railway infrastructure. It became a not-for-dividend company that owned and 
maintained the rail infrastructure. Several accidents occurred and structural changes were made. NR was earlier a 
heavily regulated private company but became a government body in 2014, implying more control by the Ministry of 
Transport. The company is responsible for timetabling, access to the network and projects on the infrastructure 
throughout England, Scotland and Wales.  
Most projects are managed and controlled by NR and then they seek suppliers in the market place for different 
aspects of the project. Consultancy support is used to define and manage the projects. NR has got its own national 
supply chain part of the business, which supplies a lot of the resources to major projects. NR has used DB contracts for 
many years to allocate more freedom but also responsibilities to the supply market. In recent years, they have also 
changed towards more collaboration with contractors and NR is aiming for earlier contractor involvement to identify 
the best value for money and the required outcome.  The increased focus on collaboration is a step to go from 
transactional to more relational arrangements since the transactional approach has not proven fruitful in terms of 
certainty of outcome, efficiency of outcome, nor sustainability of the supply chain. 
4.2. Cross-Country Comparison  
4.2.1. Delivery System 
In many countries, contracts regarding infrastructure investments have become increasingly performance-based to 
trigger innovative activities that are less likely to occur under conditions of the traditionally highly specified DBB 
contracts [2]. The traditional delivery system for all investigated countries is DBB, but most of the countries have 
moved away from this type of contract. In general, there is a trend towards decreasing the use of DBB contracts and 
trying to incorporate more DB contracts, especially for large and complex infrastructure projects. See Table 3. for a 
comparison of delivery systems. 
Table 3. Delivery systems compared across the five countries 
 
Competition: Design by contractor (DB) 
or by client (DBB) 
Coopetition: Early involvement in joint 
design, contractor (DB) or client (DBB) 
is responsible 
Cooperation: Joint design 




DBB is mainly used. All planning and 
design performed in-house; contractors are 
executors. 
Not used. Not used. 
Netherlands  
(Pro Rail) 
DB is most common for new investments 
but DBB is still used for re-investments. 





Traditionally, DBB is most common and 
is still used for e.g. preparatory work on 
parts with much traffic. DB becomes more 
common. JBV strives for fewer and larger 
contracts, with fewer interfaces between 
actors. 
Contractors are procured earlier now and a 
dialog in the early stages is important 
especially with foreign contractors. Client 





DBB is the traditional system, but 
becomes less common. Aim at 50 % DB 
contracts. DB will increase for track work 
and civil engineering. In reality sometimes 
similar to DBB. 
TRV try to leave much design work to the 
contractor but sometimes the client is 
more involved in the design work anyway. 
Sometimes the contractor is procured early 
and involved in design work based on 
DBB contracts. 
Has been tested. 
UK  
(NR) 
DBB is the traditional way but becomes 
less used. DB is most common, but in 
reality sometimes similar to DBB. 
Sometimes client is more involved in the 
contractor’s design work in DB contracts. 
Striving for ECI but struggles 
with contractor selection for 
this. 
 
Large DB contracts are perceived to encourage international contractors to enter smaller Scandinavian markets in 
Norway and Sweden. TRV has started a change process towards increased use of DB contracts, but DBB contracts are 
still common in some regions. In Sweden, bridges and some other civil engineering works are mainly procured by DB 
contracts, but there are now several examples of DB contracts used for other parts of railway construction as well. In 
the future, DB may be used more frequently in large scale complex projects. However, the historical usage of DBB 
contracts has resulted in inexperience among many contractors regarding the market for consultancy services and how 
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to manage the design stage. Furthermore, the large set of rules regarding railway construction limits the freedom in 
design for DB compared to the road sector. JBV in Norway is also using DB contracts to an increasing extent, and here 
as well a change process is taking place within the railway sector where DB contracts have been well received. In the 
Netherlands and the UK this change process has been going on for a much longer period of time. Hence, the most 
common delivery system for large construction projects in these two countries is DB, and DBB has become less and 
less used. However, in the Netherlands, DBB is still used for reinvestments.  
In some of the countries (e.g., in the UK and Sweden) the DB contracts are in practice sometimes similar to DBB 
contracts since they may be rather detailed and specified. In Sweden, this was especially apparent in the beginning of 
the change process where detailed DBB contracts were rebranded to DB contracts. It is important to point out that, at 
least in Sweden, highly specified DB contracts are very similar to DBB contracts, both in practice and from a legal 
point of view, since the client has to take responsibilities for the specified solutions in DB contracts [17]. This type of 
hybrid approach may be counterproductive, by hindering contractors to improve both innovation and efficiency.  
In Germany, all planning and design is done in-house by Deutsche Bahn engineers. DBB is therefore the main 
delivery system and the respondents believe that this type of contract will remain most common. When the degrees of 
freedom are very limited, it may be better for a competent client to use DBB contracts and specify the design 
themselves. This seems to be the case in Germany and the contractors are thereby seen as construction firms, rather 
than providers of competence. A main argument for keeping most of these activities in-house is the difficulties of 
obtaining the building permissions and that such risk is expensive to transfer that to contractors. 
In Norway, the coopetition strategy is apparent as contractors are now procured earlier and the design is the result 
of an informal collaboration between client and contractor. To have a dialog in an early stage is especially important 
for JBV when working with foreign contractors. Furthermore, it is especially important in complex construction 
projects for knowledgeable clients to get involved and contribute to joint development work (Jacobsson & Roth, 2014). 
Close collaboration in the design stage in DB contracts can thereby be an alternative to DBB contracts when clients 
want to get involved in design work and affect technical solutions [17]. 
Also in the Netherlands contractors are involved early in new investments through DB contracts, but the exact 
moment for involvement is not standardized and depends on the project. In the UK, early contractor involvement (ECI) 
has been identified as essential to identify best value for money and required outcome. This is in line with the literature 
where early contractor involvement is identified as supporting innovation and development [26]. However, although 
Network Rail is striving for early contractor involvement, they find it difficult to select contractors based on soft 
criteria in early stages. ECI based on consultancy contracts has also recently been tested in Sweden to some extent, but 
as a few pilot projects rather than as a large scale implementation. 
4.2.2. Reward System 
DBB contracts with unit prices connected to a bill of quantities are used in all five countries, but most commonly in 
Germany. For DB contracts and for projects where the uncertainty is low, fixed prices are generally used in Sweden, 
Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. In the Follo line project in Norway, a fixed price is determined for a baseline 
situation, a price that is then adjusted in the case of exceptional ground conditions. In Sweden, fixed price is explored 
and tested for DB contracts but only when it is possible for contractors to calculate their costs with sufficient accuracy, 
that is, when projects are rather straight forward and not too complex and uncertain. Then, the risk premium does not 
become too high.  
In the UK, the majority of the larger contracts in the railway sector are based on incentives connected to a target 
cost, supporting collaborative working. The gain and pain is shared, typically split 50/50. The target cost can be 
adjusted during the contract and the reason for not using a fixed price is that it seldom becomes the final price. In 
reality there are no truly fixed prices since they are adjusted due to changes. A related challenge when using target cost 
is that contractors can spend too much time trying to drive up the target cost rather than to reduce the actual costs. This 
has caused a lot of friction in the UK between the client and contractors. A known disadvantage for incentive-based 
payment is that adjusting the target cost often gives rise to discussions or even disputes similar to those of adjusting a 
fixed price [21-23]. This is also the reason for why this type of reward system is not used in Norway. In the Swedish 
discussion regarding target cost, this drawback has been acknowledged and a split 80/20 to the client is now suggested, 
because this sharing mechanism provides sufficient incentives for contractors while reducing their risks and thereby 
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Table 4. Reward systems compared across the five countries 
 
Competition: Fixed price 
Coopetition: Cost 
reimbursement with 
incentives and target cost 
Cooperation: Cost 
reimbursement with bonuses 
Germany 
(Deutsche Bahn) 
Fixed unit price connected to a bill of 
quantities is mostly used as it offers 
flexibility during contract time. 
Not used Not used 
Netherlands  
(Pro Rail) 
Fixed price is most common for DB and 
DBB. 
Not used 
Cost reimbursement with bonuses 




Fixed unit price has been most common. It 
provides flexibility when there are 
uncertainties regarding quantities of 
materials. Fixed price is used for large 
projects where risks are predictable. Fixed 
price will increase and become more 
common than unit price. 
Cost reimbursement with 
incentives and target cost is 
typically not used as it may 
drive sub-optimizations. 
Cost reimbursement with bonuses 
is typically not used as it may drive 
sub-optimizations and are hard to 
objectively assess. Bonuses are 
sometimes introduced later in 




Fixed unit price is traditionally used for 
DBB and for projects with large 
uncertainties. Fixed price is becoming 
more common in DB contracts for tracks 
and civil engineering works. Fixed price 
will increase when DB contracts increase. 
Cost reimbursement with 
incentives and target cost is 
sometimes used for 
complex uncertain projects. 
Cost reimbursement with bonuses 




Fixed price has become an unusual reward 
system but is used for small and simple 
projects. 
Cost reimbursement with 
incentives and target cost is 
used for the majority of 
larger contracts, with or 
without contractor's design. 
Not used 
Bonus opportunities linked to other soft aspects are not used to a large extent in the five countries. In the UK, KPIs 
are mostly used to discuss if a contractor is doing well or not in an area, instead of as a basis for economic rewards. 
However, there are a few cases where KPIs have been used to influence the payment to the contractor. Future reward 
system factors such as customer satisfaction during the project, attitudes towards passengers and sustainability are 
discussed in the UK. Linking bonuses to such non-economic aspects is a more collaborative way of using bonuses [5, 
24], and NR is aiming for increased collaboration with the contractors. In Sweden, bonuses have been used in some 
occasions. Examples of bonus criteria are: timeliness, temporary traffic, cooperation, and environmental performance. 
In the Netherlands, bonuses are seen as a mechanism that often causes sub-optimizations and it is found difficult to 
objectively assess when bonus criteria are fulfilled. Therefore, incentives and bonus criteria are typically not used, 
except for the time parameter to minimize the time a section is shut down due to work. However, the discussion in the 
Netherlands regarding bonuses is ongoing. In Germany, bonuses for early delivery are not on the agenda since it is not 
possible to take railway into service earlier than planned. Furthermore, it is believed that tax payers’ money should not 
be used to reward performance covered by the original contract. 
4.2.3. Contractor Selection 
Selecting capable contractors is a critical task for clients [25, 26]. Contractor selection, in terms of bid invitations 
and evaluations differ somewhat among the countries. However, pre-qualification is used in all five countries to 
receive well prepared bids from capable contractors. As such, the purpose of prequalification is often twofold: 1) to 
increase the chance of selecting contractors with strong capabilities and avoid poorly performing contractors, and 2) to 
motivate capable contractors to dedicate sufficient time and resources to prepare bids with high quality. All client 
organizations seem to adopt a view that it is better to receive a few strong bids than a larger amount of bids with highly 
varying quality. See Table 5. for a comparison of contractor selection methods. 
 
Table 5. Contractor selection 
 
Competition: Open invitation, high 
focus on lowest price 
Coopetition: Pre-qualification, lowest 
price and soft criteria 
Cooperation: Direct 




Traditionally 100 % price, but during 
recent years soft criteria have been 
introduced. 
80 % of the projects use pre-qualification. 
Qualification period 3-5 years. Soft 
criteria for quality and delivery 
performance are in the pipeline to 
strengthen life-cycle cost. 30-40 % soft 
criteria has been tested 
Negotiation used when only 
on pre-qualified contractor is 
available. 





High focus on lowest price is most 
common. The price and soft criteria 
ratio varies depending on the projects.  
Pre-qualification is always used. 
Contractors are selected for a certain time 
(3 yrs) and scope is not for a single 
project. Soft criteria are often 10-30%, but 
will increase. Common soft criteria: 
contractor’s project solutions, experience 
and capabilities, CO2-ladder for climate 




High focus on lowest price is most 
common. 5-10% weight on soft criteria 
in DBB contracts. High focus on soft 
criteria often avoided since it has to be 
defended internally and towards losing 
bidders. 
5-6 contractors are pre-qualified. 15-20% 
soft criteria in larger uncertain and 
complex projects with DB contracts. 
Trend towards using more soft criteria in 
general. Examples of soft criteria: 
organization and resources, project 
planning and execution, earlier relevant 
experiences and references, safety, 
political risks 
Not often used, but in rare 
occasions up to 50 % soft 




High focus on lowest price is most 
common. Soft criteria can be 5-10% in 
many projects. Management, 
organization, risk, management model, 
collaboration model, realization plan 
etc. 
Pre-qualification is used and 4-6 
contractors are pre-qualified. Larger 
weight on soft criteria (10-20%) in large, 
uncertain and complex projects. More 




Pure focus on only lowest price is not 
common because tender price is 
typically 25-40 % lower than actual 
final price. 
For large complex projects soft criteria are 
more important, as much as 40% weight. 
Common soft criteria: technical aspects 
(methodologies, people and programs), 
safety and sustainability. For large 
complex projects passenger journey time, 
handling capacity and disruptions during 
building process are more important than 
price. 
Direct negotiation is used for 
larger projects if the 
specifications need 
adjustments or if the clients 
want to make changes. 
 
 As for bid evaluation, lowest price is still the most important evaluation criteria but all countries include soft 
criteria as well to some degree. One major reason for this focus on price is that the clients fear appeals from the losing 
contractors, stating that the evaluation has not been performed in a transparent and objective way. This is also 
supported by the literature, stating that lowest price is often the most important bid evaluation criterion, especially 
among public clients due to the fear of appeals [17]. However, although lowest price selections have been dominant, 
this is starting to change and many respondents across the studied countries believe that soft criteria will become more 
important in the future.  
In terms of soft criteria, the focus in Sweden is on organization and management as well as risk management, 
collaboration and realization plan. Organization and planning is included in Norway too, as well as experience and 
safety. In the Netherlands, the main focus is on a climate friendly solution and reduction of CO2 emissions. The “CO2-
ladder” developed by ProRail is one way to make soft criteria less subjective and easier to evaluate in transparent and 
objective ways. In the UK, a sustainability factor is included but the measurements for this criterion are under 
development. Methodologies and organizations are also included. In Germany, logistics and planning are included to 
complement the price criteria. 
Some respondents discussed the ambiguous importance of soft criteria. One the one hand, soft criteria often don’t 
affect which contractor is selected. That is, even when soft criteria are evaluated the contract is often awarded to the 
contractor with the lowest price. However, the inclusion of soft criteria is argued to improve the quality of the bids 
since soft criteria make contractors really think through and plan the project more thoroughly during the bid 
preparation phase. A challenge using soft criteria is that the evaluation is more subjective and therefore can lead to 
appeals from losing contractors. In Norway, a large focus on soft criteria is therefore avoided in mainstream projects. 
Soft criteria increase in importance in complex and uncertain projects, especially if the contractor is procured early 
in the project. In Norway, the soft criteria can constitute up to 50 % of the total criteria in rare occasions if it is deemed 
necessary. It is especially vital that tender evaluation focuses on soft criteria in complex projects or when the 
contractor is expected to contribute to innovation in the design stage [29]. 
4.2.4. Collaboration 
In general, formal partnering agreements are not commonly used in the five countries, except for Sweden and the 
UK. TRV has traditionally not used partnering in railway projects. However, since 2015 a formal policy states that a 
basic collaboration model should be used in all contracts. Hence, the current strategy explicitly involves formalized 
cooperation, although the basic model is not very extensive. However, an extended collaboration model has been 
developed and is now implemented in very complex and uncertain projects. In the UK, there is a clear collaborative 
approach, due to a perceived need to move towards more relational rather than transactional arrangements. Alliances 
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are used to generate the best ideas and to get early contractor involvement to decide the best way forward. Joint 
objectives enhance the development of a win–win situation in which all project participants together strive to improve 
project performance as formulated in objectives [36].  
In some countries, there is an emphasis on more informal collaboration. In Norway, there are no formal 
collaborative arrangements but JBV find cooperation important and some of the contracts have a cooperation phase in 
the beginning to ensure well-prepared and coordinated teams. JBV strives to obtain good relationships and cooperation 
with contractors in informal ways. Some collaborative tools and activities are used, such as teambuilding activities and 
workshops to align contractual understanding and cultural awareness. Collaborative arrangements are not used by 
ProRail, apart from a light form of project alliance that is currently under development. The risk is however not fully 
shared in these alliances due to safety restrictions. Deutsche Bahn in Germany does not focus on any formal 
collaborative arrangements with suppliers when projects are federally financed due to the public tendering law and the 
anti-cartel management. Due to historical and cultural reasons, Deutsche Bahn is very hesitant to engage in 
collaboration with external suppliers; focusing on competition is considered more appropriate and less controversial. 
Table 6. presents the collaboration models in terms of tools and activities. 
 
Table 6. Collaboration 
 
Competition: No collaborative 
tools/activities 






No collaborative arrangement due to 
the public tendering law. 
Informal long-term relationships with 
regular meetings, performance reviews, 
feedback, etc. BIM has been initiated 
and will open up for collaboration and 
transparency.  
Not used. 
Netherlands   
(Pro Rail) 
No formal collaborative tools or 
activities except for applications to 
control the amount and the progress of 
different projects.  
BIM is on an experimental stage in 
smaller projects. Partnering not used and 




No formal collaboration agreements.  
Initial cooperation phase to ensure well 
prepared and coordinated teams. 
Informal cooperation based on trust and 
transparency. Team building activities 
and workshops are used and joint IT-
tools.   




Since 2015 the basic cooperation level 
includes joint objectives and risk 
management, conflict resolution 
methods, workshops and partnering 
facilitator. BIM is used since 2015. 
Extended collaboration model 
is implemented 2016 and 
includes ECI, soft criteria, 




A need for more relational than 
transactional relationships is identified 
due to inefficiency. 
Working towards long-term 
relationships with contractors. 
Alliances to generate ideas and 
achieve ECI. Standardization of 
alliance agreement on-going.  
 
 In the UK and in Sweden, there is an outspoken belief that collaboration will become even more important in the 
future, especially in Sweden due to the newly developed collaboration policies. In Norway, the Netherlands, and 
Germany the respondents do not foresee any strong trend towards partnering in the future, but some informal 
cooperation is considered important. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
5.1. Change Processes in the Five Countries 
The procurement strategies in the five countries vary, as illustrated in Tables 3-6. Traditionally, procurement 
strategies are in many countries based on detailed DBB contracts and competitive tendering focusing on lowest price 
[20, 21]. This competitive focus is still noticeable in Germany, where regulations, culture, and history work against the 
trends towards allocating more responsibilities to and collaborating with external suppliers. However, these 
competitive strategies are also in stark contrast to the trend towards an increased use of cooperation and partnering 
arrangements in the construction industry in many countries during the last decade [33, 36]. Coopetitive and 
cooperative strategies are adopted by TRV, JBV, ProRail, and NR when they try to increase the suppliers’ 
responsibilities and contract freedom through the use of DB contracts. By getting involved and supporting the 
contractors in the design work, the clients can achieve sufficient extent of direction of the process and customization of 
the end product, at the same time as contractors have possibilities to adopt efficient technical solutions and production 
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processes. It can also be a way to decrease potential friction on the market by using more relational arrangements, 
which is the case in the UK. 
Traditionally, clients from the five studied countries have focused on enhancing competition in their procurement 
strategies regarding construction work. This focus stems from in-house production, which gradually has been 
outsourced. In a second step, also design and development work have been outsourced in some countries, but then 
mainly to consultancy companies. However, during recent years there is a discernible trend in Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands and the UK towards allocating more responsibilities to contractor companies and increasing the strategic 
focus on cooperation. This may be seen as a third step in the trend towards using the supply market, where also design 
and/or development work is outsourced to contractors instead of consultancy companies. The increase in infrastructure 
investments in these countries has put efficiency and value for money at the top of the agenda. Hence, the use of DB 
contracts has increased and many relationships can now be characterized as coopetition, rather than pure competition. 
The UK and the Netherlands are forerunners in this trend, although with different approaches, whereas Norway and 
Sweden is in the middle of this transition. Germany has not yet initiated this change but respondents believe that 
collaboration will become somewhat more common in the future for larger projects. However, cultural aspects and the 
strict anti-cartel laws in Germany are hindering this change. Most respondents in this study believe that their client 
organizations will become more cooperative in the future and that contractors will be involved earlier and given 
greater responsibilities. As such, the third step of the market oriented trend seems to focus on two main dimensions: 
degree of cooperation and degree of contractor responsibility. Figure 2. illustrates how the five countries are clustered 






















Figure 2. Change processes in the five countries 
Deutsche Bahn in Germany has rather low degrees of both cooperation and contractor responsibilities, and is 
therefore placed in the bottom left corner of the figure. However, the respondents believe that both these dimensions 
may be increased somewhat in the future (illustrated by short dotted arrows). The other four countries form a cluster 
that has moved away from the bottom left corner during the last decade. The Netherlands and the UK were first to 
initiate this change but while ProRail has mainly focused on increasing the degrees of responsibilities among the 
contractors, Network Rail has also focused on strengthening the cooperation. The respondents believe that these 
changes will continue but ProRail will probably focus on strengthening the cooperation, whereas NR will probably try 
to increase both dimensions. Sweden and Norway are in the midst of this transition and both TRV and JBV anticipate 
significant changes in the near future in the same direction (illustrated by long bold arrows). However, TRV will 
probably focus equally on both dimensions while JBV seems to focus more on increasing the contractor involvement 
and freedom. If the anticipated changes play out in the five countries, it seems that the cluster of four countries will 
remain but move upwards and to the right in Figure 2. 



















Civil Engineering Journal         Vol. 3, No. 4, April, 2017 
211 
 
5.2. Tailoring Procurement Strategies to Project Characteristics 
Prior research has not verified that there is one best way to procure construction projects. Instead procurement 
strategies must be tailored to the project characteristics at hand to fit the purpose [17]. According to this perspective, a 
high focus on competition is suitable in simple projects with low uncertainty, where the client either has low 
customization requirements (DB contracts) or has the possibility and capability to design the project according to 
stable requirements in DBB contracts. Coopetition is suitable when complexity and uncertainty becomes somewhat 
higher and cooperation is required when project characteristics are very challenging; see Figure 1. in Section 2. The 
clients in Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the UK seem to have adopted such a perspective, as the respondents 
pinpoint the need of tailoring the procurement strategies to the project characteristics at hand. Hence, they use a lot of 
different alternatives for different projects, although the general trend is towards more cooperation and DB contracts. 
The change processes that several of the clients are currently undergoing call for systemic and purposeful follow-up 
investigations that can improve our understanding of the consequences of the changes. Due to the complex 
interconnections between the four procurement strategy components, it seems urgent for railway clients to test 
different combinations and investigate how different components interact and how various combinations work in 
practice in different types of projects. These results can serve as input to further improvements and change of 
procurement strategies. 
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